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The press routinely reports
extraordinarily large govern-
ment deficits, mainly consist-
ing of interest costs, for coun-
tries experiencing high rates
of inflation.1 For example, the New York Times
reported that in 1993 Brazil’s government deficit
was 30 percent of the country’s gross domestic
product (GDP).2 Most of this deficit was accounted
for by interest costs. In the late 1980s, less
dramatic but still large government interest
costs (around 12 percent of GDP) were reported
for Italy. These large ratios are computed by
dividing a government’s nominal interest pay-
ments by nominal GDP. Financial specialists
know such figures to be substantial overstate-
ments because they fail to account for the real
capital losses that government creditors experi-
ence during high inflation.3
Every year, an equally flawed ratio is
reported in the federal budget of the United
States. Figure 1 reports these official interest
expenses as a percent of federal outlays over
the period 1960 to 1995.4 The figure displays
the well-known 1980s growth in interest pay-
ments as a fraction of outlays, a hallmark of
Reaganomics. Figure 2 displays our corrected
estimates of federal interest expenses as a frac-
tion of federal outlays. Compared with the
official numbers, the true figures are much
more variable, and lower on average.
It is timely to note that section 7 of the
recently proposed balanced budget amendment
explicitly includes the official interest payments
on the federal debt as expenditures.5 We are
not necessarily suggesting that the framers of
the amendment are unaware that this measure-
ment is flawed from an purely economic stand-
point. The current measure tends to overstate
interest payments more the higher the inflation
rate is. By including the official measure of
interest costs, the amendment’s framers may
intend to add incentives to lower both inflation
and expenditures.
This article describes and defends our
corrections to the official series. After showing
how to do the accounting correctly, we calcu-
late how the interest costs of the government
would have been affected had it used a different
debt-management strategy. We simulate the
consequences of particular versions of shorts
only and longs only debt-management policies,
two classic policies that have been advocated.
A flawed measure of the government’s
cost of funds
When investors compute the real return
on an equity or debt investment, they take into
account dividend and coupon payments, the
change in price of the stock or bond, and the
effect of inflation on the general price level.
So should the government in accounting for
its interest costs to the public.
In each time period, the government repays
its debtholders in two ways: explicitly in the
form of coupon payments and principal repay-
ments, and implicitly in the form of real capital
gains on outstanding debt stemming from the
diminished term to maturity of the debt, interest
rate changes, and inflation. To measure the
government’s cost of funds, one must account forFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 19
the capital gains and losses on all outstanding
Treasury securities.
The federal government reports an incor-
rect measure of its cost of funds. It records an
imperfect measure of its explicit interest costs
and ignores its implicit interest costs. The
government computes its cost of funds by form-
ing the sum of current coupons on long-term
coupon bonds and the appreciation on short-
term discount bonds.6 This measure of the
government’s cost of funds, shown in figure
1, is a remarkably smooth series, and it is
always positive.
The following example illustrates how the
government’s methodology mismeasures its
cost of funds. Consider two bonds that would
raise the same value for the government at time
t = 0, assuming no uncertainty and a constant
real interest rate, r. One is a pure discount
(zero-coupon) bond with ten periods to maturi-
ty, paying off P0 at time 10; the second is a
coupon bond with coupon c, paying off P1 at
time 10. From the net one-period interest rate we
can compute the discount factor, 1/(1 + r). The
value of the pure discount bond p0(t) satisfies
p0(t) = (1 + r)–1p0(t + 1), for t = 0, 1, . . . , 9,
where p0(10) = P0. Evidently, for the pure
discount bond, interest accrues through the grad-
ual appreciation in the value of the bond from
p0(0) = (1 + r)–10 P0, at time 0 to p0(10) = P0 at
time 10. The rate of appreciation equals the
gross interest rate:
1 + r  =  
 p0(t + 1)
.
The value p1(t) of the coupon bond satisfies
p1(t) = c + (1 + r)–1 p1(t + 1), t = 1, . . . , 9 and
p1(0) = (1 + r)–1p1(1), where p1(10) = P1. The
interest rate satisfies
1) 1 + r  =    
c
p1(t)
   + 
p1(t + 1)
p1(t)
for t = 1, . . . , 9.
For coupon bonds of finite maturity with a
principal payment at the end (really a last big
coupon), interest payments (that is, the left-hand
side of equation 1) include more than the cou-
pon. Hence, it is not appropriate to measure the
interest costs associated with coupon bonds by
simply adding up the coupons due this period.
Indeed, coupon payments do not represent pure
interest in an economic sense; they are partly a
repayment of principal. Furthermore, part of the
return to investors, and of the cost to the issuer,
is in the form of capital gains or losses on bonds
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Total cost of funds and interest costs
as a share of government spending
FIGURE 2
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of
Economic Analysis, National Income and Product
Accounts, various years.
Note: The cost of funds was calculated using equation 5.
Sources: Authors’ calculations and U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, National
Income and Product Accounts, various years.ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 20
payment is partly a pure discount bond with a
significant portion of its return coming in the
form of capital gains or losses over time.
Our example indicates some but not all
of the corrections that we want to make in the
government’s accounting for its interest costs.
The other adjustments have to do with the treat-
ment of inflation, the time variation in interest
rates, and the existence at any moment of a
variety of bonds with various coupon schedules
and maturities. Next we expand our example to
incorporate all of these features and show how
to do the accounting properly.
Doing the accounting right
We can build a system for properly counting
the government’s real interest costs by careful-
ly rearranging the government’s period by
period budget constraint. We manipulate the
budget constraint algebraically to isolate ex-
plicit and implicit interest expenses. Explicit
interest expenses are the real capital gains on
one-period discount bonds; implicit interest
expenses are the capital gains to the public
from holding longer term bonds.
First we need to convert nominal yields
to maturity on government debt into prices of
claims on future dollars in terms of current
goods. The modern theory of the term structure
of interest rates prices a coupon bond in three
steps: 1) viewing the coupon bond as a bundle
of pure discount bonds; 2) unbundling it into
the constituent pure discount bonds and valuing
these components; and 3) adding up the values
of the components to attain the value of the
bundle. The theory thus strips the coupons
from the bond, and prices the bond as though
it is a weighted sum of pure discount bonds of
maturities 1, 2, . . . , j. (The market and the
government have followed theory: pre-stripped
zero-coupon bonds, or STRIPS, themselves are
available in the market.)
Let sjt be the number of dollars at time t + j
that the government has promised to deliver, as
of time t. To compute sjt from historical data,
we have to add up all of the dollar principal-
plus-coupon payments that the government has
promised to deliver at date t + j as of date t.
Let ajt be the number of time t goods that
it takes to buy a dollar in time t + j. We work
with a real (inflation-adjusted) price, ajt, denom-
inated in units of time goods (so-called dollars
of constant purchasing power) and not time t
dollars, because we want to keep track of the
government accounts in real (in goods) terms.
We can calculate the prices ajt from
2) ajt   =      
  nt
       (1 + rjt) j 
,
where nt is the value of currency (the recipro-
cal of the price level, measured in goods per
dollar), and rjt is the yield to maturity on a
j-period pure discount bond.7 Equation 2 tells
how to convert the yield to maturity rjt on a
j-period nominal pure discount bond into the
real price of a promise, sold at time t, to one
dollar at time t + j.
Let deft be the government’s real net-of-
interest budget deficit, measured in units of
time t goods. We can write the government’s










where it is understood that a0,tm º nt and n denotes
the longest years to maturity for bonds.8 The
left-hand side of equation 3 is the real value of
the interest bearing debt at the end of period t,
determined by multiplying the number of time
t + j dollars that the government has sold in the
form of j period pure discount bonds, sjt, by
their price in terms of time t goods, ajt, and then
summing this product (or value) over all such
outstanding bonds, j = 1, . . . , n. The right side
of equation 3 is the sum of the current net-of-
interest real deficit, deft, and the value of the
outstanding debt that the government owes at
the beginning of the period, which in turn is
simply the value this period of the outstanding
promises to deliver future dollars, sj,t–1, that the
government issued last period.















These two forms of the budget constraint
are algebraically equivalent. We have re-
marked how equation 3 expresses the real
value of total debt with which the government
leaves a period t, S
n
j=1 ajtsjt as the sum of the
real value of obligations with which it entersFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 21
the period, S
n
j=1 aj–1, tsj,t–1, and the government’s
net-of-interest deficit, deft. Equation 4 breaks
the first term on the right side of equation 3
into an interest component and a previous
value component. Again, the left-hand side of
the budget constraint in equation 4 is the real
value of government debt that the government
has outstanding at the end of period t. The first
term on the right-hand side of the budget con-
straint in equation 4 represents interest on the
government debt, and can be decomposed as





The first term in equation 5 is explicit interest
and the second term is implicit interest or the
capital gain to the public on its claims on the
government. Thus, the term nt – a1, t–1 is the per
dollar real capital gain accruing to one-period
discount bonds issued at time t – 1. The term
aj–1, t – aj, t–1 is the  change in the price in terms
of goods between t – 1 and t of a claim to one
dollar in time t – 1 + j; multiplying this change
in price by the dollar value of time t – 1 + j claims
outstanding, sj,t–1 at time t – 1, and summing over j
gives the capital gain to the public.
These capital gains are not trivial. In figure 3
we plot the per dollar nominal capital gains,
S
n
j=1(aj–1,t – aj,t–1), for one-year, seven-year, and
14-year zero-coupon bonds. There are three
things to note. First, capital losses can be quite
large, and they occur frequently. These losses
occur during periods of rising inflation or rising
interest rates. Second, the capital gains and
losses of bonds of different maturities move
together. So the government could not have
eliminated the inflation and interest rate risk
inherent in its portfolio by manipulating the
maturity structure of the debt. Third, the longer
the maturity of the bond, the greater the volatility
of the capital gains. Increasing (or decreasing)
the average maturity of the outstanding debt
increases (or decreases) the government’s and
the public’s exposure to inflation and interest
rate risks.
In figure 4 we report our breakdown of the
total interest costs on the marketable federal
debt between explicit and implicit real interest
costs. In general, the explicit interest costs were
relatively small and relatively constant from
1960 to 1995. In contrast, the implicit interest
costs were substantial, variable, and often nega-
tive. Since the real value of the outstanding debt
was growing over this period, sjt was growing
over time. So the per dollar capital gains are
being multiplied by increasingly large numbers.
Thus the implicit interest cost became more
volatile throughout the sample period.
We compute the total interest costs born
by the federal government by simply adding
up the explicit and implicit interest costs. Total
interest costs as a percent of government outlays
are plotted in figure 2. The explicit, implicit,
and total interest costs, as well as the total debt
outstanding, in millions of 1983 dollars are

























Sources: See figure 2.
Note: Capital gains are calculated per unit on a year t +
j – 1 dollar, as of date t, measured in time t dollars. The
authors converted the capital gains to current dollars
by multiplying aj – 1,t – aj,t – 1 by the time t price level, vt
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aktskt calculations plotted in figure 1, our computed
costs of funds are quite volatile.9 These costs
were negative during periods of large capital
losses in the Treasury bond market (for example,
the high inflation episodes of the 1970s and the
dramatic fall in bond prices in 1994).
Ultimately how volatile the federal gov-
ernment’s interest costs are depends on how
the government shares inflation risk and inter-
est rate risk with the public. The Treasury and
the Federal Reserve can alter this risk-sharing
arrangement between the government and the
public by manipulating the maturity structure
of the outstanding debt. To illustrate this, we
run three counterfactual portfolio strategies.
Evaluating alternative portfolio
strategies
Assuming that postwar U.S. interest rates
had remained unchanged, how would
the government’s interest expenses have been
affected if it had followed a different debt-
management policy? If we restrict the govern-
ment to issuing from its historically observed
menu of instruments, this question can be
answered by mechanical calculations. We
compose alternative hypothetical portfolio
strategies, and track the net costs the govern-
ment would have incurred at historically real-
ized interest rates.10 Below we describe how
these costs can be calculated, and perform
some of these calculations.11
Given historical time series data on {ajt, sjt,
deft, nt}T
t=t0 we can use equations 4 and 5 to
account for interest payments on the govern-
ment debt. Given {ajt, deft, nt}T
t=t0, we can eval-
uate the effects on the government budget of
portfolio strategies {sjt}T
t=t0 other than the histori-
cal one. These alternative portfolio strategies
must be constructed to respect the government
budget constraint in equation 3.
The alternative strategies are:
1. Shorts only: Set sjt = 0 for j > 1, "t.
2. Tens only: Set sjt = 0 for j ¹ 10, "t.
3. Longs only: Set sjt = 0 for j < n, "t, where n
is the longest bond priced by the McCulloch
and Kwon (1993) dataset.
The first and third policies represent the
poles of proposed debt-management policies.12
For an economy with only nominal interest













  fkt  = 1.
In words, fkt is the fraction of the outstanding
debt at time t that is due at time t + k.
Restrictions in equations 6 and 7 are alge-
braic implications of the government budget
constraint in equation 3. Let S
n
j=1 aj–1,tsj,t–1 º Vt
be the value of interest bearing government
Federal government’s interest costs
in millions of 1983 dollars
Year Explicit Implicit Total
1960 9,358 0 9,358
1961 4,886 3,863 8,748
1962 5,484 10,142 5,626
1963 3,916 394 4,310
1964 7,536 7,593 15,129
1965 5,809 –2,738 3,071
1966 4,523 3,325 7,848
1967 5,370 –7,843 –2,472
1968 3,440 –3,733 –293
1969 2,027 –7,477 –5,449
1970 6,780 13,596 20,376
1971 5,174 8,640 13,813
1972 2,501 –1 2,500
1973 –9,354 –7,662  –17,016
1974  –13,212 –9,568  –22,780
1975 –3  539  536
1976 3,596 10,573 4,169
1977 –4,796  –10,077  –14,874
1978 –5,321  –16,504  –21,825
1979 –6,629  –17,580  –24,208
1980 –2,081  –17,979 –20,060
1981 10,887 –3,618 7,269
1982 27,383 57,556 84,939
1983 18,009 8,730 26,739
1984 23,430 37,918 61,349
1985 24,336 87,049  111,385
1986 31,339  101,356  132,696
1987 7,496  –20,884  –13,388
1988 12,637 19,428 32,066
1989 19,623 73,032 92,655
1990 6,981 12,851 19,832
1991 20,768  105,116  125,884
1992 7,037 40,695 47,732
1993 5,884 90,648 96,532
1994 6,882  –73,186  –66,304
1995 28,537  173,862  202,399
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debt at the beginning of period t. Given a
policy fkt, k = 1, . . . n, together with observed
interest rates, equation 5 can be solved for
skt, k = 1, 2, . . . n:
skt = (akt
fkt) (deft + Vt).
This equation can be solved recursively
to build up records skt and decompositions of
interest cost under alternative hypothetical
debt-management rules.
The first two policies fall into the set of
simple rules that are time invariant, that is,
 fit = fj " t .
For the bills only policy, f1t = f1 = 1 and
fkt = fk = 0 for all k ¹ 1. For the tens only policy
f10t = f10 = 1 and fkt = fk = 0 for all k ¹ 10. Our
third policy, longs only, is a time varying policy,
which depends on the maturity of the longest
bond outstanding each year during our sample
period. For each of these policies, the entire
debt is purchased and resold to make sure all
the debt is held in either one-year bills, ten-year
zero-coupon bonds, or n-year zero-coupon
bonds (depending on the experiment).
For any feasible specifications of fjt, we
can evaluate the implicit and explicit interest
costs of financing a stream of government
deficits. Our three policies will have quite
different effects, largely through the behavior
of the value of currency, nt.
The data
The sjt series are computed using data from
the CRSP Government Bonds Files. For each
Treasury note and bond outstanding, CRSP
reports the maturity date, the coupon rate, and
the face value held by the public. The original
source for these data is table PDO-1 of the Trea-
sury Bulletin. Since neither the Treasury Bulletin
nor CRSP reports the face value of Treasury
bills held by the public, these data are backed
out of table FD-5 of the Treasury Bulletin. All
data are as of December 31 of each year.
The value of the currency, nt, is computed by:
  
100 nt   =        ,
            
pt
where pt is the price level. The price level is
the monthly series CPI—all items, from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics. The base for the
CPI series is 1982–84 = 100. We sample the
December observation of each year to create
the annual pt series.
The yield to maturity series, rjt, is con-
structed by point sampling end-of-month data
from McCulloch and Kwon (1993) and Bliss
(1996) containing the zero-coupon yield curve
implicit in U.S. Treasury coupon bond prices.
Hence rjt is the yield to maturity on a j-period
pure discount bond as of December 31 of year t.
We calculate the prices, ajt, using equation 2:
        nt ajt  =                ,
         
(1 + rjt)j
where j = 1, 2, . . . , 30 and t = 1960, . . . , 1995.
In constructing our counterfactual debt-
management figures, we use equations 4 through
7 with the appropriate time-invariant fit. We imputed
the real net-of-interest deficit series, deft, from the
government budget constraint, equation 3, using
the actual ajt and sjt series.
The results
Below, we discuss some of the properties
of the actual sjt and fjt series, review the histori-
cal paths for inflation and the term structure of
interest rates, and report the results of our
experiments.
Figure 5 shows the average maturity for
our calculated sjt series. Its variations generally
match those of the average maturity of the
federal debt series reported by the Treasury,
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pure discount bonds
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some problems the Treasury’s series (for ex-
ample, it confines itself to marketable securi-
ties only after 1975) and prefer our methodolo-
gy of reducing each bond to a zero-coupon
basis by allocating coupons to the year in
which they fall due.
The average maturity falls from the mid-
1960s to 1975 and rises steadily for about
thirteen years before leveling off at four years
for the last seven years of the sample. The
steady fall in the average maturity during the
late 1960s and early 1970s is partly the conse-
quence of federal legislation, repealed in
1975, which prevented the Treasury from
issuing long-term instruments paying interest
above a threshold rate that market rates were
then exceeding. As we shall see, by causing
the Treasury to shorten the average maturity
of its debt during the high inflation years of
the 1970s, this law prevented the government
from fully benefiting from the negative im-
plicit real interest it managed to pay through
inflation.13
Figure 6 plots the percentage of the federal
debt due within j years for 1965, 1975, and
1995. This figure was constructed by taking a
cumulative sum of the observed f jt series for
each of the three years. Throughout the period
we studied, the federal debt was heavily
weighted toward securities with maturities of
one year or less. In 1995, almost 40 percent of
the government’s portfolio was due within one
year. Only a tiny fraction of the federal debt is
financed with long-term bonds.
Figure 7 plots the percentage change in the
price level, the inflation rate, and is dominated
by the high inflation rates of the 1970s. The
spread between the ten-year bond rate and the
one-year bond rate is plotted in figure 8. When
this difference is positive, the yield curve is
upward sloping. When it is negative, the yield
curve is inverted. In general, the inflation rate
and the slope of the term structure moved in
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Ten-year rate minus one-year rate
FIGURE 8
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics and Federal Reserve Board of Governors.
Source: J. McCulloch and H. Kwon, “U.S. term structure
data, 1947–1991,” Ohio State University, working paper,
No. 93-6, 1993; and R. Bliss, “Testing term structure
estimation methods,” Advances in Futures and Options
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flatten or become downward sloping during
periods of rising inflation.
Figures 9 and 10 display the results of our
first experiment: a bills only policy. Figure 9
shows that the realized total real interest (explicit
plus implicit) would have been somewhat
higher during the late 1960s and most of the
1970s under the bills only policy than under
the actual policy followed. During the late
1960s the yield curve was inverted, so long-
term rates were below short-term rates. But,
more importantly, the high inflation of the
1970s substantially decreased the real value
of the federal government’s outstanding obli-
gations.14 However, this pattern reversed in the
early 1980s; in the second half of the sample,
as inflation fell and the yield curve became
consistently upward sloping, the interest costs
under the bills only policy would have been
lower than under the actual policy.
Figure 10 shows that under the bills only
policy the real value of the marketable interest-
bearing debt would have been higher through
the mid-1980s. But by the end of the period
the real value of marketable interest-bearing
debt would have been lower under the bills
only policy than under the actual policy. Had
the bills only policy been followed, the out-
standing debt would have been 34 percent of
GDP. In 1995, the actual debt to GDP ratio
was 41 percent.
Figures 11 and 12 show what would have
been the total real interest costs and the real
value of marketable debt had a policy been in
place of leaving only ten-year bonds outstanding
at the end of each year. Figure 11 shows that
relative to the actual policy, real interest costs
would have been much more variable year to
year and would have been negative for many
years, especially during the inflationary years
of the 1970s. Note that as the size of the federal
debt grew, following such a policy would have
substantially increased the volatility of the
federal government’s cost of funds. Figure 12
shows that under a tens only policy, real gov-
ernment debt would have been 53 percent of
GDP in 1995.
Figures 13 and 14 show the total real interest
costs and the real value of the debt under a
policy of issuing the longest available maturity
(that is, the longest maturity that was actually
priced in McCulloch and Kwon’s (1993) data
set). We see more variable interest costs but
less accumulation of debt under the longs only
policy than under the tens only policy. Note
that in the 1970s, due to the high inflation, the
real value of the outstanding debt would have
been substantially lower under the longs only
than under the actual policy. However, by the
end of the sample period, the ratio of the out-
standing debt to GDP under the longs only
policy would have been considerably higher























Marketable debt as a share of gross
domestic product, bills only
FIGURE 10
Sources: See figure 2. Sources: See figure 2.ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 26
These results indicate that debt-manage-
ment policies weighted toward longer maturi-
ties would have led to lower interest costs and
less accumulation of debt over the period from
1960 to 1980. After 1980, debt-management
policies weighted toward shorter maturities
would have generally lowered interest costs
and led to less accumulation of debt. From
figure 5 it is clear that the Treasury and Fed-
eral Reserve reduced the average maturity of
outstanding debt throughout the 1960s and
early 1970s; they then increased the average
maturity during the late 1970s and throughout
the 1980s. Our analysis indicates that to have
minimized its borrowing costs, the government
should have engaged in the opposite strategy.
Of course, with hindsight we could have
found the portfolio-share policy that would have
minimized the government’s cost of funds.
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Marketable debt as a share of gross
domestic product, tens only
FIGURE 12
Sources: See figure 2. Sources: See figure 2.
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exercises is not to engage in “Monday morning
quarterbacking” but to illustrate how the matu-
rity structure of the debt affects how the gov-
ernment and bondholders share inflation and
interest rate risk.
Moreover, caution is in order in interpret-
ing the results of an evaluation of a counterfac-
tual debt-management policy. Interest rates are
a random process, and the result of following
a given strategy is too. What most drives the
outcome of our counterfactual exercises is the
outcome for inflation. In issuing nominal secu-
rities, the government is offering the public a
risky instrument whose real return is sensitive
to the rate of inflation over the life of the bond.
Our results indicate that from 1960 to 1995,
inflation came in high with sufficient frequency
to let the government often pay negative real
interest and sometimes substantially negative
real interest. These high inflation rates make
the longer maturity portfolio policies come in
with lower interest costs during the 1970s.
Clearly, the outcome would have been differ-
ent had inflation come in much lower.
Conclusion
This article makes two points. First, the
federal government reports a flawed measured
of its own cost of funds. Second, the maturity
structure of the debt influences the way infla-
tion risk and interest rate risk are shared by the
government and its creditors.
The first point is not just nit-picking. By
ignoring the effects of inflation and changes
in interest rates on the value of the outstanding
federal obligations, the official interest pay-
ment calculations make it difficult to evaluate
the true cost of various proposals. For example,
the introduction of index bonds will change
how the government shares inflation risk with
its creditors since the government can not
induce capital losses on these bonds through
inflation. How these bonds can be expected
to influence to government’s cost of funds is
beyond the scope of this paper; but it should be
clear that the Treasury’s accounting methods
are inappropriate for evaluating the costs of
these new bonds.
The second point is a word of caution re-
garding periodic calls for the Treasury to “pain-
lessly pare billions from its interest bill by refi-
nancing the government’s existing debt with
bonds that mature more quickly.”15 While our
counterfactual experiments demonstrate that
shortening (or lengthening) the average maturity
of the U.S. debt can at times save the Treasury
billions of dollars, these savings depend on the
future paths of interest rates and inflation—two
series which are notoriously hard to predict.
And if the government bets the wrong way, the
mistake can be quite expensive.
NOTES
1This article extends estimates and arguments from Sar-
gent (1993).
2See the article by Nash (1993).
3See Ljungqvist and Sargent (1997) chapter 8, exercise 1;
and Blanchard and Sachs (1981).
4The series plotted is net interest paid by the federal
government from the National Income and Product
Accounts. The figure displays a series which is remark-
ably smooth and always positive.
5See H.J. Resolution 1, 105th Congress, 1st Session.
6The Department of the Treasury calculates the net inter-
est as the sum of coupon payments, accrued interest on
bills and zero-coupon bonds, and interest on nonmarket-
able debt.
7We use the yield to maturity series for pure discount bonds
constructed by McCulloch (1990) and McCulloch and
Kwon (1993). These data were updated by Bliss (1996).
8See Sargent and Wallace (1981) for a discussion of this
form of the government budget constraint, in particular
for a defense of the use of pre-tax real yields on govern-
ment debt and a net of interest government deficit. Sar-
gent and Wallace use a ‘crowding out’ assumption to
justify the use of pre-tax yields.
9The Treasury’s calculations include some assets (chiefly
savings bonds and some securities issued to state and
local governments) that are not included in our analysis.
So these two graphs are not strictly comparable. Never-
theless, we expect that adding these assets to our analysis
would not change the results in any meaningful way.
10Under the assumption that historical interest rates would
have been unaffected by the switch in debt policy, this
accounting exercise involves no use of economic theory.
To infer the government’s costs had it issued different
assets, for example indexed bonds, we would need a
theory about the price of pure discount indexed bonds.
11The standard theory of the term structure of interest rates
assumes that interest rates on all maturities would beECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 28
REFERENCES
unaffected by alterations in the maturity structure of the
government’s debt. This assumption can be justified by
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